Emergency Evacuation of Heritage Collections: an ICCROM-UNESCO handbook

 

 

Emergency Evacuation of Heritage Collections (ICCROM-UNESCO) – Handbook cover.

Protecting Cultural Heritage is  mainly aimed at avoiding that any kind of  hazard could pose an excessive  risk to the objects that must be preserved. There are conditions, nonetheless, that oblige to evacuate the artefacts, since the preventive measures cannot be anymore effective.  So, in specific situations, museums and their staff may  go through challenging times due both to natural disasters and climate change.

In the case of museums, when they  are threatened for their role in protecting and valorizing precious witnesses of the past and human creativity, their intrinsic value for intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding  must be protected and supported.

UNESCO and ICCROM have published in English and in Arabic an handbook about the protection of Cultural Heritage objects during conflicts. Such activity  is challenging and can be life threatening.

The handbook provides step-by-step guidance for evacuating cultural collections under extreme conditions. It is aimed at assisting people and  institutions,which try to prevent the destruction and looting of cultural objects during a crisis situation. It can be used also to train others and to improve emergency preparedness at cultural sites. According the document, the Egyptian Heritage Rescue Foundation (EHRF), a Cairo based non-governmental organisation, has performed the field-testing of the workflow.

Emergency Evacuation of Heritage Collections (ICCROM-UNESCO) – Document, Pack and move infographic.

The handbook deals the evacuation of cultural heritage objects, how to do it, which workflow adopt, how to assess the threat and other important aspects of  preparedness and management of emergency evacuations. Obviously, the handbook cannot give instructions on the prioritisation in removing objects, since such activity is strongly related to a complex  assessment depending of many different considerations but it has the merit of drawing attention to this passage of emergency procedures and providing some basic information.

The document can be downloaded from the ICCROM website or here:

ICCROM-UNESCO Emergency Evacuation of Cultural Heritage of Handbook

Effects of Fire on Cultural Resources and Archaeology: an USDA publication

USDA – Forest Service – Wildland Fire in Ecosystems Effects of Fire on Cultural Resources and Archaeology.

A problem neglected by the most of the studies concerning the protection of Cultural Resources against natural hazards deals with the exposition of archaelogical artefacts to vegetation fire risks. All tangible and intangible cultural assets can be damaged by fires. Thus, archaeological remains are exposed to the risk caused by forest fires.

A publication, dated 2012, is an accurate state-of-knowledge review that provides a synthesis of the effects of fire on cultural resources.  The goal of the volume is to provide cultural resource/archaeological professionals some basic information on fuels, fire behavior, and fire effects to enable them to protect resources during fuels treatment and restoration projects and wildfire suppression activities. The other goal is  to provide fire and land management professionals  with a greater understanding of the value of cultural resource protection and the methods available to evaluate and mitigate risks to Cultural Heritage.

The report describes fire effects on tangible and intangible cultural resources,  for planning, managing, and modeling fire effects  and a primer on fire and fuel processes and fire effects prediction modeling.

The archaeological site of Faragola (Italy) partially destroyed on Sept. 8th,  2017 by a fire. The fire has severely damaged mosaics and marbles of  the Roman settlements (IV-VI century B.C. Picture from: http://www.ilrestodelgargano.it/politica/2017/09/news/incendio-sito-faragola-in-puglia-m5s-un-patrimonio-storico-non-tutelato-dalle-istituzioni-20305.html/)

A synthesis of the effects of fire on various cultural resource materials is provided for ceramics, rock art, historic-period artifacts/materials, and below-ground features. Finally, the document discusses the importance of cultural landscapes to indigenous peoples and emphasizes the need to actively involve native people in the development of collaborative management plans. The use and practical implications of this synthesis are the subject of the final chapter.

The report can be used by fire managers, cultural resource (CR) specialists, and archaeologists to manage more effectively wildland vegetation, fuels, and fire.

The risks of wildland fires to Cultural Heritage have been discussed  in the STORM project, aimed at improving the protection of Cultural Heritage against the effects of climate change.

The ABC Method: a risk management approach to the preservation of cultural heritage

Cover of the ABC Method document. (Credits: ICCROM website)

Risks to cultural heritage vary from catastrophic events (such as earthquakes,  floods,  etc) to gradual processes (such as chemical, physical, or biological degradation). The result is loss of value to the heritage. Sometimes, the risk does not involve any type of material damage to the heritage asset, but rather the loss of information about it, or the inability to access heritage items. So, heritage managers need to understand these risks well so as to make good decisions about protection of the heritage (for future generations) while also providing access for the current generation. ICCROM (Intergovernamental Organisation devoted to protect Cultural Heritage)  and the Canadian Conservation Institute have published the “The ABC Method: a risk management approach to the preservation of cultural  heritage”.

The handbookl is based on the five steps pf the management cycle (Establish the context,  identify risks, analyze risks, evaluate risks, treat risks)  and, for each step, three or more tasks are identified, whose complete list

1. Establish the context

  • Task 1: Consult with decision makers. Define the scope, goals and criteria.
  • Task 2: Collect and understand the relevant information.
  • Task 3: Build the value pie.

2. Identify risks

  • Task 1: Assemble the appropriate tools and strategies.
  • Task 2: Survey the heritage asset and make a photographic record.
  • Task 3: Identify specific risks, name them, and write their summary sentences.

3. Analyze risks

  • Task 1: Quantify each specific risk.
  • Task 2: Split or combine specific risks, as needed.
  • Task 3: Review and refine the analyses.

4. Evaluate risks

  • Task 1: Compare risks to each other, to criteria, to expectations.
  • Task 2: Evaluate the sensitivity of prioritization to changes in the value pie.
  • Task 3: Evaluate uncertainty, constraints, opportunities.

5. Treat risks

  • Task 1: Identify risk treatment options.
  • Task 2: Quantify risk reduction options.
  • Task 3: Evaluate risk reduction options.
  • Task 4: Plan and implement selected options.

The document is an important study aimed at helping cultural heritage managers and risk assessment professionals in starting the process that limits damages to buildings and artefacts. The document is freely downloadable from the ICCROM website.

The NFPA 909 – 2017 Edition on “Protection of Cultural Resource Properties: Museums, Libraries, and Places of Worship” has been published

The 909 Standard “Protection of Cultural Resource Properties — Museums, Libraries, and Places of Worship” – 2017 Edition has been published by National Fire Protection Association.

The standard describes principles and practices of protection for cultural resource properties (museums, libraries, and places of worship etc.), their contents, and collections, against conditions or physical situations with the potential to cause damage or loss. The updates for the 2017 edition include:

  • expanded provisions for outdoor collections and archaeological sites and their protection against wildfire;
  • further clarification of sprinkler system corrosion protection criteria;
  • mandated integrated system testing per NFPA 4, Standard for Integrated Fire Protection and Life Safety System Testing;
  •  the addition of numerous events to Annex B, Fire Experience in Cultural Properties.

According to the 909 code, libraries, museums, and places of worship housed in historic structures have also to comply with the requirements of NFPA 914 (Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures).

The standard includes provisions for fire prevention, emergency operations, fire safety management, security, emergency preparedness and inspection, testing, and maintenance of protection systems.

As in the previous editions, criteria are provided for new construction, addition, alteration, renovation, and modification projects, along with specific rules addressing places of worship and museums, libraries, and their collections.

Historic District Protection Planning: A Case Study

1Danny Mac Daniels (Colonial Williamsburg Foundation) has presented the following theme during the september 20th , 2012, Venice meeting on emergencies in historical centers.

Historic District Protection Planning A Case Study

Lexington, Virginia

The City of Lexington, located in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, was established as the town of Lexington in 1778. Today, Lexington has a permanent population of about 7500 with another 4000-5000 students attending Washington and Lee University and the Virginia Military Institute from September through May. Lexington is well known for its architecture and historic preservation. Tourism and higher education are its major industries and its downtown is a thriving collection shops and restaurants, many housed in restored buildings dating from the late 18th to the early 20th century. Lexington is a typical small city in southern America: many buildings in the downtown area have party walls, construction tends to be brick exteriors over wood framing with combustible roofs, and some older buildings are completely wood frame construction. The streets in Lexington, while not as narrow as many streets in Europe, are narrow when compared to the size of most modern fire apparatus.

The Lexington Presbyterian Church Fire

Lexington Presbyterian, a Greek revival style church, was completed in 1845 and it is one of the centerpieces of Lexington’s history and its visual appeal. Lexington was home to Confederate General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, and he worshipped at the church in the years leading up to the American Civil War. The sanctuary underwent some renovation between 1845 and 2000, but overall the building changed very little and there was no fire detection or fire suppression system installed when in the summer of 2000 the governing board hired a contractor to repaint the exterior of the building. The board, aware that the dry, 155 year old long-leaf yellow pine wood in the building posed a greater fire hazard than newer material, had the contractor chosen for the work demonstrate the hot-iron technique he proposed to use to soften the paint before scrapping it off. The board approved the process and the contractor began work. On Tuesday, July 18, as workmen were using a hot iron to strip paint off of a cornice around the base of the church’s clock tower, the hot iron apparently ignited a fire in the roof area of the wood frame structure that destroyed one sanctuary and caused the clock tower to collapse.

According to fire investigators from the Virginia State Fire Marshall’s Office, workmen removing paint from a cornice at the base of the clock tower noticed smoke at about 9:30 a.m. The workmen searched for the source of the smoke and found a fire inside the clock tower behind the cornice they had been working on. The workmen attempted to extinguish the fire, and when they could not, they notified the Lexington Volunteer Fire Department. Some volunteer firefighters responded quickly, but since it was a normal workday and most of the members were at work, many were delayed getting to the church and calls for mutual aid went out to other nearby jurisdictions. By 10:00 a.m., heavy smoke was pouring out around the base of the clock tower.

Fire fighters began to battle the blaze with ladder pipes shortly after 10:00 a.m., but by that time the fire in the clock tower was fully developed. Firefighters worked to save the clock tower through the morning; however, the combination of the highly combustible wood frame construction of the church and the amount of water needed to fight the blaze put a strain on the city’s aging water system.

At about noon the clock tower finally collapsed. Fire investigators pointed out that the firefighters did an excellent job keeping the fire from spreading to other structures and because of their efforts no one was injured when the clock tower collapsed into the street.

Damage to the building was estimate at $2.5 million, and shortly after the fire the church board announced the church would be restored to its original condition and restoration work began soon afterward. The restoration was substantially completed when a new clock tower was installed on March 5, 2002.

A senior architectural historian with the Virginia Department of Historic Resources pointed out after the fire that using heat to strip paint on old wood fixtures that are hollow or that cannot be seen from behind, like the cornices that were being stripped at Lexington Presbyterian where rats or birds sometimes build nests, can cause combustible materials to catch fire without workers knowing it.

The Aftermath

In August 2000 the president of the Rockbridge County Historic Society called and asked me to come to Lexington to share information about how Colonial Williamsburg protects its historic buildings and to see if some of those things might be adapted to help Lexington improve protection in its historic district. She also wanted to know how the concepts in the 1997 edition of NFPA 909, Standard for Protection of Cultural Resources might be applied to historic districts. As a first step she arranged a one-day workshop for members of Lexington’s city government, merchants, and other interested parties. The workshop was surprisingly well attended and during the discussions it became evident to the political leaders that much of what made Lexington an attraction for tourism could be lost in a single fire. After the workshop I met with the mayor, the chief of the volunteer fire department, and the president of the Rockbridge County Historic Society to brainstorm ideas to improve fire safety in Lexington’s historic district. In the discussion we identified four major challenges:

• Many of the buildings in the historic district have party walls, and some interconnect at the attic level. The fire department was aware of some of the interconnections; however, the fire chief suspected many more existed that were not on any drawings or building plans.

• The Commonwealth of Virginia has a statewide fire prevention code, but in a city as small as Lexington that has a volunteer fire department no one locally enforces the code and any inspections have to be done by the State Fire Marshall’s office. As with most state agencies, the Virginia State Fire Marshall’s office has a small staff to cover a very large area. In practice, the only inspections the State Fire Marshall’s office can do are in the largest state-owned facilities; so, there is very little, if any, enforcement of fire prevention regulations in privately owned buildings in cities like Lexington.

• Lexington’s aging water supply system was challenged to provide enough water to fight the fire in the church and the fire chief expressed concern about its ability to handle a fire spreading from building to building in the downtown area through interconnecting attics.

• Access is difficult for fire apparatus in many parts of the downtown area because of traffic congestion and narrow streets, particularly during the summer when tourism is at its height.

Two initiatives were undertaken as a result of the discussion:

• The Rockbridge County Historic Society and the Lexington Volunteer Fire Department agreed to

focus efforts on a public education program in fire safety management. To help with the project, local residents with backgrounds in fire protection and fire suppression were recruited to conduct public awareness campaigns, fire safety educational programs, and voluntary fire safety inspections for merchants and home owners. Lexington is a popular retirement area for professionals from urban areas in the northeast United States, and several highly qualified individuals volunteered to assist with the project.

• The Lexington City Council agreed to create a position in the Building Department for an inspector who would devote 50% of his time to building code issues and the other 50% to conducting inspections to enforce the Virginia Statewide Fire Prevention Code.

Lessons Learned

More than a decade has passed and over those years I’ve drawn the following lessons from my experience in Lexington.

1. The fire codes and standards in place at the time, and since, including the most recent editions of NFPA 909, Code for the Protection of Cultural Resource Properties – Museums, Libraries and Places of Worship and NFPA 914, Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures provide no guidance on planning and implementing fire protection programs for historic districts. The NFPA Cultural Resources Committee has been discussing the issues for several years, and it hopes to provide some guidance on the subject in the 2015 edition of NFPA 914. In 2000, the NFPA Cultural Resources Committee was several years away from the paradigm shift it made in the 2010 and 2013 editions of NFPA 909 and the upcoming 2015 edition of NFPA 914 that take an all-hazards approach to protection planning. The shift was crucial because it focused protection planning efforts on the outcome of a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. Such an approach is especially important when thinking of protection in historic districts where one way to approach the issue is to think of the historic district as a very large multiple use occupancy building with multiple owners /tenants (like an apartment building or condominium). From that perspective the district is analogous to a museum building that contains a collection – that is the individual buildings inside the district – and provides the support infrastructure, utilities, and services to maintain them. The planning issues are similar, as well. For example, egress is a primary concern in both, particularly during an earthquake, flood, or conflagration; however, ingress is also a significant issue for both because the collection (buildings, artifacts, or works of art) must be protected in place and to do that, emergency responders must have ready access. Other common issues include water supply (or lack thereof), occupant notification, fire department response time, fire prevention, security and planning for emergency operations and damage limitation.

2. The assessment we did in Lexington was flawed because it addressed only a few of the vulnerabilities, so the resulting action plans only scratched the surface of the problem. The steps taken in Lexington after the fire in 2000 only addressed two limited aspects of the problem (education and enforcement) but failed to address the significant infrastructure issues (water supply, limited availability of volunteer firefighters during the normal work day, fire department access during the busy summer months in the downtown area, installation of automatic sprinklers, etc.). A comprehensive vulnerability assessment of all the hazards is the key to a successful protection plan in a building or in an historic district.

3. Dividing an inspector between building department duties and fire prevention code enforcement probably is not a sustainable model. Building departments are partially self-sustaining because they generate revenues from building permits and plan reviews while fire prevention activities generate no direct revenue. As a result, when municipalities face budget shortfalls, as they have since 2008, they tend to focus on activities that generate income and that moves fire prevention code enforcement to the back burner. After all, governmental memories are short and fires are low probability events even if the consequences can be devastating.

ICT and Massive Rescue Operations in Historic Districts

1Stefano Marsella (Italian Fire Corps) has shown, during the Venice meeting of 20 september 2012 on emergencies in historical centers, how Italian Firefighters Corps have coordinated hundreds of operations in l’Aquila earthquake using a communications protocol (CAP – common alerting protocol) which have enabled operators on the field to exchange data and receive priorities from the Heritage authority.

The same system made it possible to publish information on the official National Fire Corps website, in order to give the most updated information.

Download the presentation: Marsella

NFPA Committees and Historical Building Safety

1Deborah Freeland (Area Senior Vice President Property Loss Control Arthur J Gallagher & Co.)and Donald Moeller (Principal The Fire Consultants, Inc.) explain the activity of the NFPA Committees 909 e 914 to improve fire protection of cultural and historical heritage.

Download the pdf (without slides with pictures) presented during the september 20, 2012, Venice meeting about emergencies in historical centers: 1

Training staff to emergencies in historical buildings

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Steve Emery, Fire Safety Adviser for English Heritage, has presented in Venice, during the  September 20th international meeting, how English Heritage is training firefighters to rescue operations when historical buildings are interested.

The key points of the presentation are:

1. Standardise Emergency Plans

2. Standardise Training

3. Trainwith Fire Services

4. Maintain the Plans

5. Desktop Exercises

6. Cross Organisation Help and Liaison

7. SalvageEquipment

The presentation: Emery

Fire Safety in Historic Venice Hotel: Risk Control Assessment

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During the 20th september 2012 Venice meeting on emergencies in historic centers the argument of controlling fire risk using CFD techniques has been presented by Andrea Ferrari – Luciano Nigro (Associazione Italiana di Ingegneria Antincendio): The Fire Risk Control effectiveness assessment using correlations, fast running tools and a CFD code in an historic hotel building: A.Ferrari-L._Nigro_a_Venezia

Venice meeting on emergency in Historical Centers

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VENICE – SCUOLA GRANDE DI SAN GIOVANNI EVANGELISTA

20 September 2012: International Workshop  – Protecting historic centres during emergencies

The Italian National Fire Corps (CNVVF) has organized the meeting, which will address to historical centers emergency. The use of IT technologies in this field and the techniques used to put in place provisional works to save historical buildings after an earthquake will be shown, with reference to the l’Aquila earthquake experience.

Some presentation will show problems of fire protection in historical buildings.

Session 1 – Technical codes and case studies
Chairman
Maurizio Crovato (Chief editor of RAI International)

  • 10.00 Nfpa 909 and 914 and statistics Donald Moeller – Deborah Freeland (NFPA)
  • 10.20 Fire standards in Italy: problems and solutions Luca Nassi (CNVVF)
  • 10.40 Toronto Distillery district Fred Leber (Leber/Rubes Inc.)
  • 11.00 Protection of the Historical Architecture and criteria of Equivalent Safety Renata Codello (Soprintendency of Venice)

Break

13.10 Questions and discussion

Break
Session 2 – Emergency management – Chairman Loris Munaro (CNVVF)

DOWNLOAD THE LEAFLET:  Venice Provisional Program – vers. 29.8.2012

Cultural Heritage and Forest Fires

picture taken from Kosmas Dimitropoulos , Kovanc Köse, Nikos Grammalidis, and Enis Cetin paper
picture taken from Kosmas Dimitropoulos , Kovanc Köse, Nikos Grammalidis, and Enis Cetin paper

Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing is the art, science, and technology of obtaining reliable information from noncontact imaging and other sensor systems about the Earth and its environment, and other physical objects and processes through recording, measuring, analyzing and representation. The International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, devoted to the development of international cooperation for the advancement of photogrammetry and remote sensing and their applications. The society has published on its website among other conference proceedings the paper concerning “fire detection, and 3D fire propagation estimation for the protection of cultural heritage areas”.

The abstract of the paper states that  beyond taking precautionary measures to avoid a forest fire, early warning and immediate response to a fire breakout are the only ways to avoid great losses and environmental and cultural heritage damages. To this end, this paper aims to present a computer vision based algorithm for wildfire detection and a 3D fire propagation estimation system. The main detection algorithm is composed of four sub-algorithms detecting:

  • (i) slow moving objects,
  • (ii) smoke-coloured regions,
  • (iii) rising regions,
  • (iv) shadow regions.

After detecting a wildfire, the main focus should be the estimation of its propagation direction and speed. If the model of the vegetation and other important parameters like wind speed, slope, aspect of the ground surface, etc. are known; the propagation of fire can be estimated. This propagation can then be visualized in any 3D-GIS environment that supports KML files.

Fire Research Database – FReD – English Heritage

EnglishHeritage This database was set up by the public body English Heritage to enable all those responsible in any capacity for historic buildings to share information on related fire safety matters.

The database has now been expanded to allow PDFs of research reports to be attached, as well as giving contact points for current or planned projects and details of published reports.

this is the link to FReD Web page:

http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/professional/research/buildings/fire-research-database

Fire Safety Retrofitting in Historical Buildings

1aImproving fire safety level of historical buildings is one of the most common problems to deal with after a fire risk assessment. The theme is not easy, since fire safety technical issues are relevant as conservation ones.  In August 1989, the US Government Agency General Service Administration published the paper “Fire Safety Retrofitting in Historical Buildings” in cooperation with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.

The document provides guidance to ensure that fire safety retrofitting has minimal impact on the historic features of the property.

Fire_Safety_Retrofitting_in_Historic_Buildings

NSW Guidelines on Fire Safety in Heritage Buildings

aState of New South Wales (Australia) has published the Guidelines on fire safety in heritage buildings. In the introduction to the guidelines it is stated that fires in buildings are life threatening and often occur without warning. This gives building occupants little time to react – to fight the fire or evacuate the building. Prevention of fires is the most effective method of dealing with this threat and is the responsibility of both building owners and statutory authorities.

Current building regulations are encompassed in the Building Code of Australia (BCA). Most of NSW heritage buildings were built prior to the adoption of these regulations. In fact some of our very old buildings predate the existence of any formal building regulations in Australia. Many heritage buildings do not meet the full requirements of current building regulations and may need upgrading for fire safety.

The Guidelines, published also in the official Cost C17 Action website, can be downloaded also from this post:

NSW_maintenance_8_1_fire_heritage

The Arson Threat to the Built Heritage and Historical Buildings

un angolo dal teatro feniceWe publish the paper concerning the arson threat to the built heritage already published by the COST Action C17: Built Heritage: Fire Loss to Historic Buildings in its Final Report Part 1 (pages 90-92)

La Fenice Venice

On Friday 30 March 2001, a court in Venice found two electricians guilty of setting fire to La Fenice opera house in the city in 1996. Enrico Carella and his cousin, Massimiliano Marchetti, were found to have set the building ablaze because their company was facing heavy fines over delays in repair work. Mr Carella, the company’s owner, was sent to prison for seven years, while Mr Marchetti received a six-year sentence. The rebuilding of the famous theatre, for which Giuseppi Verdi composed several operas, was delayed and did not re-open until 2004. The fire on 29 January 1996 happened as the Teatro La Fenice was being renovated. The subsequent rebuilding did not go according to plan and the original German-Italian consortium of Holzmann-Romagnoli had asked for supplementary and fee waivers before the work was re-tendered by the City Mayor Paolo Costa.

Sinsheim Mosque, Germany

On the 18 November 2004 unknown individuals threw a Molotov cocktail at a mosque near Heidelberg in Germany. A glass bottle filled with flammable liquid was tossed against the entrance of the Sinsheim mosque. The fire was discovered and extinguished after it caused around €10,000 damage to the wooden door and the glass window.

Wooden Churches, Poland

In Poland, wooden church were found to be particularly at risk. Between 1999 and 2000, 50 churches burnt down. The most frequent cause of fire is not damage to electric installations, but a fire lit deliberately. Poland has a substantial amount of sacred wooden architecture, which make an important, often unique, contribution to European heritage. It consists in part of wooden churches, built between the C14 and C19, mainly Catholic, but there are also other churches, including Protestant, Orthodox, Catholic-orthodox, Dukhobor, Jewish and Mariavites churches. Wooden religious architecture also includes chapels, belfries and morgues. The scale of the task is significant, given that presently there are 2,785 items of religious wooden architecture in Poland and six of them (from the C15 and C16) are on the World Heritage List.

The Arson Threat

It is difficult to be precise about the growth in arson globally due to statistical variations, but there is good evidence that in many developed countries arson is a growing problem. The CTIF Centre of Fire Statistics demonstrated that, in 8 selected countries [Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Japan, USA and UK] between 1993 and 1999, intentional fires accounted for 18 percent of all building and structure fires. This represents a huge level of unwanted and unwelcome activity, given the fact that a significant part of any country’s built environment contains numerous heritage sites (in some major cities like Edinburgh, Venice, and Rome the figure is very high) and that certain property classifications (like religious buildings) are subject to regular attacks of the sort identified earlier. To illustrate the growth trend in the UK, according to the UK Arson Prevention Bureau, the incidence of arson in occupied buildings has steadily increased over the past decade, as shown in the following Table.

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Arson

Arson is now one of the most serious threats to heritage buildings throughout the world. The reasons for this form of attack vary enormously, from economic fraud to cultural disaffection. The nature of the attack can likewise arise from sophisticated fire raising by criminals using science and technology, to sudden unplanned attacks by vandals using any locally available materials. The impact however, regardless of the initiating event, may be the total loss of all the physical property both of contents and structure. The following real examples illustrate that the target can be a high-profile internationally-known building or a more generalised category of building-type. They serve to illustrate the task being confronted.

Whilst there are many documented causes and solutions to the arson threat, there are also particular circumstances related to heritage buildings that raise the risk presented from intentional attacks. For example, historic structures may

• Contain or be constructed in materials particularly vulnerable to fire, like wood

• Elements of structure will contain voids due to adaptations that spread fire and its products

• Modernisation may hide building services and associated features or structural elements that heighten the risk of undetected initiation or early structural failure

• Transfers and unclear ownership may lead to poor risk management

• Economic and funding priorities sometimes prevent investment in mitigating passive or active systems of fire defence

• Hazardous materials may be present on industrial or military heritage sites

• Criminal activity such as smuggling or theft may give rise to arson to cover the original crime

There are many documented responses to combating arson that suggest there is a strong onous on the heritage community to develop a sustainable and internationally-supported strategy to help preserve the national heritage of each country.

This is especially so when it is realised that within the European Union there are few special requirements placed in law on heritage buildings. A recent study supported by the European Union Community Action Programme in the Field of Civil Protection coordinated by Raddnings Verket, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, found that no heritage-specific fire safety legislative requirements were in force in Austria, Belgium, Denmark (except a 5 yearly inspection), Finland, Germany (other than a building permit for certain uses), Greece, Sweden, The Netherlands (subject to some heritage and safety controls) and the UK. In Ireland, Italy and Norway, guidance or in Italy’s case technical controls, exist.

The proposal, therefore, is that the Cost Action C17 Working Group 3 should consider extending its investigations into the area of arson reduction and protection. This will require research into national statistics, identification of the national risk profile and subsequent identification of preventative action. Whilst there are cultural and national variations in the risk presented in any approach, there is high value in sharing best practice to help improve sustainability and add intelligence to create an effective response to what is an increasingly alarming threat.

Terrorism

In the earlier section, threats arising from vandals, criminals and activists have been described. Unfortunately, it is now necessary to add to that form of attack the increased threat of extremist action from disaffected groups in society. Prior to 11 September 2001, it was the case that the number of lethal terrorist incidents in Europe had declined, although the total number of incidents rose. The escalation of the terrorist incidents that had occurred in Europe and Eurasia were, in fact, often acts of arson or vandalism. However, terrorism has become an increasingly worrying threat to all those responsible for national icons or places of large public assembly. This, in part, reflects the paradigm shift that occurred in New York when vehicles like aircraft became weapons, instead of buildings being defended against weapons. Major sites that have crowds offer the terrorist anonymity and are internationally recognisable. Frequently, they offer hard construction materials that cause maximum personal damage and lead to economic losses, including tourism. They have become the new targets. Well-known and frequently visited heritage buildings and sites that fall into this category are therefore susceptible. In addition, security measures at higher-risk sites like government centres, can serve to move the terrorist further away from the obvious iconic or transport centres to softer geographically open locations. It is, of course, important to retain a sense of perspective. Lethal events are often infrequent, and in comparison to the routinely accepted loss of life in any country, are of a low order of magnitude. Usually, the risk is simply disruptive, as with left luggage (one example is 2.5 million emergency calls to unattended bags in a 10-year period in a transport environment, with no active explosive devices found). Society, however, demands active consideration of this threat and positive action to reduce both the possible occurrence and mitigate impact. This demands a sensible and systematic review of the likelihood and practical measures. In many areas action taken to reduce prevalent and active life-threatening events such as fire and security, will coincide with action designed to contain this extremist threat. There are many previous examples of this type of attack, especially where intolerance has existed, when individuals over generations have attempted and sometimes succeeded in destroying artefacts or symbols that they consider represent that intolerant burden.

Currently trans-national ideology based upon an Islamic fundamentalist cause that is globally, not geographically, regionalised, together with localised extremism, is seen as the new threat. This, some commentators suggest, is a misunderstanding of a threat that in reality comes from local groups that may share a common ideology, but act independently and in sympathy, without any central direction or control. Personal relationships and sympathetic supporters therefore form the basis of the unstructured network of loose alliances. This is considerably different to the earlier, and in some cases still current, more usual form of threat, in which the perpetrator belonged to an organisation that wanted to find a balance between mass innocent casualties and its political aim. That form of terrorist attack was often characterised by a warning and the terrorist seeking to escape and survive.

The economic cost of mounting a terror attack is low, yet the economic impact can be extremely high. Reducing the risk is also difficult from the perspective of vigilance, since the defender has to be systematically in advance of the terrorist, who needs only one success. This is a problem that some observers say will remain a real issue for some time, with terrorism of this kind expected to last the next 20-30 years.

Again, the practice of risk evaluation supported by sound policy and practice is the key. Co-ordination of best practice, education, investigation, advice, crisis management, business continuity planning, threat monitoring and risk assessment are all required. Technical issues that arise include the threat to people and contamination of the heritage site or workplace, physical violence, and detection of weapons and malicious actions. The identification of specific high-risk sites and event scenarios, like those affecting faith premises as already observed in acts against Muslim and Jewish places of worship, is priority action, since in this threatening environment, physically high levels of protection of all sites is impractical.

Intelligence, and the recognition of connections attributed between causes (as with the desire to see the USA leave Islamic countries or resolve the Palestine issue) are important features to research and understand. Whilst these are simplifications, they do serve to raise the matter as an important concern for those who have a responsibility to protect national heritage.

Conclusion

There is a real and urgent need to evaluate the risk presented at heritage sites from malicious acts of vandalism, criminal attack and local or international terrorism. Many of the issues have common features. There would be a benefit in gathering intelligence and knowledge collectively. That task could be an extension of the current role of the COST Action C17 activities. The proposal would require modest financial support, to initially scope the issue and to prepare a more definitive action programme bid, seeking financial support from the European Union.

Fire Test On A Standing Georgian Dwelling Bath (UK) 1967

1Report on a Fire Test of a Ceiling in a Georgian Dwelling House on 2 March 1967, published in the Cost C17 Final Report vol 2  (pages 73-80)

RF Little, Chief Building Inspector, Bath City Council

Note that many of the technical testing methods described in this report will now have been superceded.

The test was carried out by Bath City Council under the supervision of the Chief Building Inspector of the City Engineers Department and the Senior Fire Prevention Officer of the Bath Fire Brigade. Observers form other authorities included

• Mr WH Cutmore, Ministry of Housing and Local Government

• Mr PMT Smart, Ministry of Technology & Joint Fire Research Organisation

• Mr Gibbs, Home Office, Fire Prevention Department

• Senior Building Inspectors from neighbouring authorities

• Senior Fire Prevention Officers from neighbouring authorities

At the time of the test (1967), no amendments to the English Building Regulations Part E had been made. The Regulations referred to are those current at that time.

Reason For Test

With the need to provide more units of accommodation, many large multi-storey houses previously occupied by one family were being converted into separate dwellings. In most cases, it was impossible to comply with the degree of fire resistance required by the Building Regulations, or the provision of non-combustible elements of structure. It therefore follows that applications for relaxation or dispensation of the Building Regulations were sought in the majority of cases.2

In a building of three or four storeys which was to be converted into flats or maisonettes, if alternative means of escape could be achieved at parapet or roof level, and the main means of escape was protected by walls and doors having half hour fire resistance, it was considered that the provisions of Building Reulgations E5, E9 (7), E10 and E12 were unreasonable for the following reasons

• A ceiling consisting of at least 1 inch thick plaster on laths, with square-edged flooring over joists 2 inches thick, will provide half hour fire resistance, which is a reasonable time for vacating the rooms of a building in case of fire

• The British Standard 476 Fire tests on building materials sets out conditions which are far more severe than those actually experienced in a room of a dwelling when a fire occurs

• Compliance with the Regulations would not be possible, economically or structurally, in this type of building

In order to test this theory, it was necessary to simulate the behaviour of a typical domestic fire, from the time of ignition, through the build-up period, for at least 30 minutes and then having extinguished the fire, to examine the condition of the ceiling and the floor above, and having established that the theory is correct, to use such information to support future applications for relaxation of the Building Regulations where similar conditions occur.

The house chosen was No.12 Chatham Row and was an end-of-terrace house, built about 1760 and comprising a basement, with an open area at the front, to one side and to the rear, and three additional storeys. The external walls were of 5 inch thick Bath ashlar stone. The interiors of the rooms were lined with timber panelling to a height of 3 feet above floor level and plastered above.

The wall separating the ground floor room (the one under test) and the entrance passage was constructed of lath and plaster on a timber studding.

• The floors were seven inch by one inch square edged flooring on eight inch by two inch joists

• The ceilings were constructed of one inch plaster on laths with ornate cornices

• The roof of timber trusses and rafters with slate covering

• The house on plan measured twenty seven feet by eighteen feet, while the room (the ceiling of which was under test) measured twelve feet, five inches by thirteen feet and was nine feet high

Measures Taken Prior To The Test

A visit was made to the Fire Research Station at Boreham Wood to ensure that the test would be similar to tests carried out by the Joint Fire Research Organisation (JFRO), and the preparations were made strictly in accordance with the advice given at that visit.

Firstly, the room was brought up to the standard one would expect to achieve after conversion, except for decoration, and this entailed the following work

• Reglazing the windows and replacement of sash cords to enable the windows to operate normally

• Testing the key between the ceiling plaster and the laths, and infilling cracks in the plaster

• Replacing floorboards in the room over the test room

• Re-floating a concrete hearth in the room over the test room

• Covering the partition wall between the test room and ground floor passage with quarter inch insulation board and plasterboard to ensure half hour fire resistance

• Infilling the door panels and covering the whole internal surface of the door with quarter inch insulation board to give half hour fire resistance and increasing the door stops to a thickness of one inch

In addition, it was necessary to provide a suitable fire load, and the JFRO indicated that it was desirable to have a fire load of five to six pounds per square foot of floor area. Better results would be obtained if this was provided by cribs of rough cut timber rather than by articles of furniture.

Four cribs were prepared. Each crib weighed 216.67lbs. which gave a fire load of 5.67 lbs. per sq. ft. of floor area. In addition to this imposed fire load, each wall had the original panelling to a height of 3 inches above the floor level.

The floor covering was removed from the floor of the room over the test room with the exception of a narrow strip of standard hard board covering a crack between two floor boards. It was essential that the temperatures during the test were accurately recorded and accordingly five thermocouples were installed in the ceiling of the test room to record the temperatures at a position 3 inches below the ceiling at intervals over the area of the ceiling.

Arrangements on the Day of the Test

Recording instruments, to which the thermocouples were connected, were installed in the first floor rear room. The floor of the test room was covered all over with 1” of damp sand and at the points where the cribs were to stand, sheets of insulation board were placed on the sand. These measures were to ensure that the fire would not burn downwards and affect the floor structure. Four cribs were set up in the test room in the positions shown on the plan.

The ignition pyre was built at a central point between the four cribs and trails led away to the cribs. The pyre and trails were of wood shavings, wood chips and sawdust and was 1’ 6” high and the trails 6” high. Immediately prior

to the ignition of the pyre three pints of paraffin were poured on the pyre to simulate similar conditions to that of an overturned oil heater. The Fire Brigade Officer assumed responsibility for fire control during the test and also provided observers to record conditions during the test.

Recording Equipment

The test required that the temperature at five points, 3 inches below the ceiling, of the test room, should be measured at short intervals from the time of ignition of the fuel, affording the fire load, in that room. Thermocouples were used and the wire selected was nickel-chromium/nickel aluminium T1/T2.

Duration Of Test

In order to simulate as near as possible the conditions and development of a normal fire in a dwelling, it was decided to allow the fire to burn 45 minutes from the time of ignition. The reasons for this period being chosen are as follows

• In a normal domestic fire with oxygen supply limited to that found in a room with doors and windows closed, severe smoke logging occurs at an early stage and the fire could be self-extinguished through lack of oxygen. Under these conditions the ceiling of the test room would not be given a satisfactory test as maximum temperatures would not be reached. Therefore, a flow of air to the fire had to be guaranteed in order to ensure it would continue to burn. Accordingly, a 2 ½” gap was left above the top sash window from the beginning of the experiment and at zero + 3 minutes a gap of 3” was opened at the bottom of the lower sash window. This was at zero + 9 minutes, increased to 6”. During the whole of the experiment the normal flue from the grate of the room was providing a cross draught.

• As the structure of the ceiling was to be tested for a period of at least 30 minutes under normal conditions appertaining at a domestic fire, and at the end of the first 15 minutes approximately, of such a fire, it is usual for a ‘fall off ’ of temperature to occur until the fire is ventilated in some way, e.g. breaking of glass in a window, it was decided that the 30 minute period of test for the ceiling should take place after that initial 15 minutes period has passed. This meant that from the time of ignition of the pyre, to the time of completion of the experiment, a 45 minute period was indicated.

• Although, in some circumstances it would have been desirable to allow the fire to burn until the ceiling under test had collapsed, in this instance it was necessary to submit the ceiling to the heat from a normal domestic fire for a period of at least 30 minutes and then, if the ceiling still remained intact, to extinguish the fire and carry out a close examination of the fire damage done to the materials forming the construction of the ceiling and the floor above.

• The door and the partition wall, between the Test Room and the passageway from the staircase to open air, had been modified to conform with normal half hour fire resisting standards. A 30 minute fire test was, therefore, demanded and again the extra 15 minutes initial burning period, appeared to be indicated in order that the performance of the door and partition could be measured against that of the ceiling.

Weather Conditions

The day was dry with cloudy and bright periods. There was a slightly westerly wind. The front window of the room under test, faced west.

Summary Of Test

Zero: At 1205 hours the incendiary materials forming the ignition pyre and comprising wood chips, wood shavings and sawdust over which 3 pints of paraffin had been poured were ignited. When reference is made to this time in the following report it will be as ‘zero’.

Zero + 2½: Within the first 2½ minutes the pyres and trails were burning well, with some build up of heat and then smoke became quite dense as oxygen in the air within the room was rapidly reduced.

Zero + 5: At zero plus 5 minutes some temperature reduction showed on the thermocouple readings and a very slight percolation of smoke occurred at the top of the half hour fire resisting door, into the passage. The window at this point of the room was opened 3” at the bottom in addition to the 2½” at the top, in order to encourage air circulation. The cribs were now alight at the bottom. Quite heavy smoke logging of the room was apparent but the cribs were still visible.

Zero + 7½: In the next 1/2 minutes (zero 5 – 7½) the top pane of the front window cracked in two places and all cribs were alight at the inner corners with smoke issuing from the tops. Temperatures started to take an upward curve.

Zero + 10: Temperatures continued to rise and a slight increase of smoke penetration was noticed around the top of the half hour fire-resisting door. The front window was opened another 3” at the bottom ( 6” in all) and flames were noted coming from the tops of the cribs at all inner corners. Vision across the room improved.

Zero +12½: Continued rise in temperature. First signs of smoke on first floor – very slight percolation between the fireplace and the door, at base of wall. Cribs now burning well on inner surfaces. Side window glazing very hot.

Zero + 15: Temperatures still rising. Highest recorded at No. 3 thermocouple 3270 C. Smoke percolation at 1/2 hour fire resisting door very slight. Small increase in temperature of door panels. Lower pane of front window cracked. Cribs burning well with flames 2’ 6” high from inner surfaces. Good vision most of room but ceiling obscured by smoke.

Zero + 17½: One thermocouple showed slight decrease in temperature recorded (No. 5) others a slight increase.The Yale lock on the half hour fire resisting door, hot but bearable to touch. Slight percolation of smoke around the door jamb. Molten paint dripping from framework of front window and top pane cracked in the side window.

Zero + 20: Slight decrease in temperature readings of thermocouples 1 and 3. Increases on all others.Yale lock too hot to touch. Smoke becoming dense inside room and flames less visible, but cribs showing increased burning.

Zero + 22½: Increase all round in temperature recordings of thermocouples. Increase in smoke percolation around door stops and door jambs. Cribs well alight nearest door. Increased number of cracks in front top window. Severe discolouration of side window by smoke.

Zero + 25: Temperature reading of centre thermocouple (No. 3) same as zero + 22½ . Slight decrease in reading from

No. 5. All others slightly up. First signs of smoke through cracks between floorboards at a point immediately above the partition wall between the test room and the passage. Slight smoke also showing in corner of room at side of the door. Again over the passageway. No apparent increase in temperature of the half hour fire-resisting door frame but slight increase evident on panels. Fire in cribs sluggish. Sash cords to lower half of front window burnt through and window dropped. Glass only slightly broken away and a reduction of visible flame with a corresponding increase of smoke evident.

Zero + 27½: Considerable drop in temperature readings of thermocouples 1, 2, 3, & 4. Slight drop in case of No. 5. Smoke now coming through crack at end of another floorboard over the ground floor passage and some percolation of smoke into the Recording Room, first floor, rear. No smoke coming from around the door stops and jambs. Pegs removed from below top section of front window to simulate sash cords burning through. Window dropped and glass dislodged where cracks had already been apparent. Smoke seen to be issuing from cracks in walls and lintel over the side window.

Zero + 30: Sudden rise in temperature recording of all thermocouples other than No. 5. Smoke now increased from the base of both door jambs near landing at first floor level and also issuing in centre of room near the thermocouple (No. 3). Very slight smoke percolation around the half hour fire-resisting door. Flames in the room high and licking the ceiling. Slight flaking from ceiling, possibly distemper or similar decorative material. Bottom pane of glass in side window cracked.

Zero + 32½: Steady increase in temperature recordings of No. 1-4 thermocouples. Slight decrease in temperature recorded at No. 5. Smoke convected from window of room on fire below, through the unglazed first floor window. Signs of smoke from the top of the wooden wainscoting near front window. Paint softening on the top rail of the half hour fire-resisting door and smoke issuing under pressure from the Yale lock. Smoke also apparent from between the top of the door and the door stops. Cribs well alight and tops of window frames and frame around window opening burning.

Zero + 35: General rise in temperature recordings. In the case of No. 2, 3, 4, 5 from 800 C – 1050 C, and No. 1 a very slight increase of 60 C. At first floor front room level considerable smoke percolation was apparent from around the sill of the front window. Smoke also percolating between the skirtings and the floorboards all along the wall between the front room and the centre of the room. The paint on the panels of the half hour fire-resisting door started to blister. The top pane of glass in the side window blown outwards by excessive pressures in the test room.

Zero + 37½: Rapid rise in temperature recorded. In the case of thermocouple No. 5 – 2260. Following a crash of glass breaking (side window – see Zero + 35) the smoke and heat entering by the first floor front window became less. Some smoke started to come up the staircase. A greater quantity of smoke apparent through the Yale lock on the half hour fire-resisting door and smoke around the door increased.

Zero + 40: Continued rapid rise in temperature recordings. 3200C in the case of thermocouple No. 1. Smoke percolation continued at first floor front room level and fire observed for the first time at the side of the front window. Heat through the unglazed windows, rising from the room below became intense. A slight increase of smoke noticeable from the upper area of the door around the stops. Fire in ground floor room at peak with plenty of ventilation by way of the two windows which were now without glazing. Slight flaking of ceiling is still all that is apparent. No breaking down of separation.

Zero + 42½ : Highest temperature reached No. 3 thermocouple, 10000 C. All others, 8950 C. or above. Fire still at its peak. Half hour fire door shows slight burning at the top. Upper panels still comparatively cool. The ceiling of the room was intensely white and appeared to be glowing. No signs of failure.

Zero + 45: Temperature still between 8430 C and 9870 C. The latter being the measurement at No. 3, thermocouple. Most smoke percolation at the first floor front room was between the chimney breast and the door. Smoke percolation also quite heavy around the base of the wainscoting panelling on the wall between No. 12 and No. 11 Chatham Row. Inspection afterwards showed that this smoke had entered the hollow partition wall around the door at ground floor level and had then risen into the void between the ceiling and floor above which was situated over the passage. The room was now becoming smoke logged. The half hour fire-resisting door was starting to warp at the top allowing smoke to pass more freely. The whole of the ceiling still apparently sound. None of the stopped in cracks had broken down. Cornices still in position. Fire still extremely hot but showing signs of being past its peak.

Zero + 45½: Temperature reading No. 1 thermocouple -7650 C, a fall of 1750 C. Ceiling still apparently sound.

Extinguishing

Zero + 46: Extinguishing of the fire commenced using 1” hose reel jet. This was augmented by 1/2 “ jet. Steam produced, caused rapid cooling of the surface of the ceiling, and the first cracks appeared. These seemed to be in positions where original cracks had been repaired. Approximately 8 sq. ft. of ceiling then fell away and access of air to the ceiling void and exposed laths resulted in some of the laths, already conditioned by conducted heat, catching on fire. Extinguishment was carried out without undue disturbance of tested material, but water hitting the door surface caused the asbestos fibre board surface to split and curl. This same effect was produced where water hit panels of asbestos fibreboard which had been fitted over recesses which were suspected of not being up to half hour fire-resisting standards. The plasterboard covering the partition wall was damaged considerably during extinguishing because fire had entered the hollow partition and water had to be directed through into the hollows at various points causing spalling of the plasterboard and plaster of the partition itself.

Observations during the test.

The ceiling under test registered the passage of flame for the whole of the test period of 45 minutes. There was no sign of cracking, distortion or material breakdown during the whole of the test other than a brief period, in the early stages, when some initial flaking occurred on some parts of the surface of the ceiling eg distemper. The fire had reached its peak at zero + 42½ and then the temperature curve had started to descend. At the peak period it was noted that the fuel cribs in the test room were almost exhausted having burned down to within 6” of the floor. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that a continual drop in recorded temperature could have been expected had the fire been allowed to burn after zero + 46. The treatment of the inner surface of the door and partition, between the ground floor passage and the Test room, to afford half hour fire-resistance was completely successful in spite of the fact that the plasterboard additional covering had not been skimmed with plaster to seal the joints. The penetration of the fire which did occur into the hollows of the laths and plaster partition over the door, was not through the protected surface but by way of the architrave over and to the side of the door opening. The fire thus by-passed the protection. Even so this must have occurred at the very late stages of the test as no flame was noticed on the floor above until extinguishing the fire in the test room well under way. It was then necessary to remove some of the lath and plaster surface of the partition in order to extinguish the hot spot.

At no time during the whole of the test was the escape route from upper floors so affected by smoke or heat that it could not be used. The separation afforded by the half hour fire-resisting partition wall and door was adequate for the whole 45 minute period of the test. Although some smoke percolation occurred past the ends of floorboards in the front room at first floor level, no flame penetrated at any time through that area of the floor over the test room. Considerable pressures were applied by hot gases both to the ceiling and the walls. This was most evident at zero + 32½ when smoke issued in the form of a horizontal jet from the Yale lock on the door, and at zero + 40 when the glass of the upper sash window at the side of the test room blew out with considerable force. The fire followed the usual pattern which can be expected when a fire occurs in a room in domestic property in which there is a normal fire load, the fire has some ventilation and is not disturbed for some period by opening doors or breaking windows. In the case of this test there was an early rise in temperature, brought about by the paraffin soaked pyre burning fiercely and then as the cribs became involved and oxygen in the atmosphere of the room became rare, a sluggish period followed. This occurred during the first ten minutes after which, by increasing the flow of air over the window sill of the front window, more rapid combustion took place. A gradual rise in temperature for a further 15 minutes when again some smoke logging developed and temperatures dropped. This was at the time that sash cords burnt through, which were holding up the bottom section of the front window. When the top window section was dropped the new supply of air stimulated the fire and a general very rapid rise in temperature resulted culminating in the peak of 10000C. being reached at zero + 41½. Fuel was at this time becoming exhausted and in the next 2 minutes a decline in temperature commenced. The heat of the test fire was sufficient to cause almost all of the 11/4” plaster skimming on the inside of the front wall of the room to leave the stonework.

Observations after the Test

The ceiling under test withstood the application of heat from a normal fire load underneath for the whole of the 45 minute test period without any visible signs of deterioration. No cracks were apparent, and after the initial flaking of surface decorative materials no further spalling or flaking was noted. The plaster cornice around the room also remained intact, other than in one short section immediately above the front window where it cracked and dropped slightly.

When water was applied to the fire in the remains of the cribs, the steam created caused, after approximately halfminute, sudden contraction of the ceiling and cracks opened up at points where previously cracks had been undercut and sealed with plaster during the preparation period. A few moments later approximately 8 sq. ft. of ceiling plaster fell to the floor. It was noticed that although some of the laths had carbonised due to heat conducted through the plaster they were not on fire, but as soon as they were exposed small flames appeared on the carbonised surfaces. These had to be extinguished to prevent further damage and during the extinguishing, further collapses of ceiling plaster took place.

With greater exposure of the underside of the floor and the joists it was most apparent that the floorboards were undamaged and the lower edge of only some of the joists, although charred in places, the charring was not of sufficient depth to measure with any accuracy. A considerable portion of the laths still remained undamaged.

A composition gas pipe passing through the void between the floor and the ceiling was undamaged. In addition, an accumulation of small twigs and fibrous material, possibly collected by mice and in itself readily combustible, found in a void between floor joists, resting immediately on top of the laths supporting the plaster ceiling, was not damaged in any way by fire or heat. The plaster decorative cornice around the room was intact after the fire on three sides of the room. In the case of the fourth side, it was only the section immediately above the front window that some signs of damage occurred. At this point the cornice cracked vertically and a section approximately 18” long dropped slightly but did not become dislodged.

Although during the whole of the 45 minutes covered by the test, some smoke did percolate into the passage and also into the first floor room above the test room, at no time was the movement of people prevented along the passage, up the staircase or around the rooms.

The fire, during the period of the test, did not penetrate the ceiling and floor structure to the room above. At zero + 58, after extinguishing had commenced, a small flame was noticed at a crack between floorboards which had been covered with a strip of standard hardboard. The hardboard was burning and flame started to travel rapidly over its surface. When the source of the flame was investigated it was found that the fire from the test room had penetrated the architrave of the door at a point over the top of the half hour fire-resisting door, and had then by-passed the ceiling of the test room by travelling up the hollow of the partition wall. This was also the route by which most smoke percolation occurred into the first floor room.

The partition and door which were converted to half hour fire-resisting standards stood up to the test remarkably well. Some percolation of smoke and heat by-passed the test ceiling by way of the hollow partition. This, however, would possibly not have occurred, had the partition been skimmed with plaster and cracks filled in accordance with normal procedure.

The door reacted extremely well. It was only at zero + 45 that the door began to warp and allow smoke to escape in increasing volume. When the remains of the asbestos fibreboard cladding was removed from the inner face of the door including the panel infills, some of the original green paint was still intact under the infills.

Conclusions

The fire resistance of a normal ceiling in a middle class Georgian house is such that it is capable of preventing fire from spreading to the floor above for at least a 30 minute period. It is normal for vertical separation between rooms and exit routes to afford half hour fire-resistance. To be consistent, therefore, a ceiling between such rooms and rooms above should also be half hour fire-resisting and a fire resistance of one hour plus, as required in some circumstances by the building Regulations 1965, between floors, would appear to be excessive. It would appear that the tests applied under furnace conditions to ceiling and partitions, to assess fire resistance, is too stringent and does not simulate conditions as they really occur in a fire in a building. Under the circumstances it would appear that the fire resistance of a sound Georgian ceiling does not require to be upgraded to one hour. Such an upgrading could result in the fire below the ceiling breaking out horizontally into the exit route and preventing escape by that route, before any warning of a fire is transmitted to persons living above.

Acknowledgements

Mr. A. E. Loveridge (then Chief Building Inspector, City of Bath)

The Chief Fire Officer, Bath Fire Brigade.

The Principal, Bath Technical College.

NFPA 909 (2010 edition) – Code for the Protection of Cultural Resource Properties – Museums, Libraries, and Places of Worshi

1

The need for fire standards in cultural resources buildings has been addressed by NFPA 909: Code for the Protection of Cultural Resource Properties – Museums, Libraries, and Places of Worship. This Code describes principles and practices of fire safety for cultural resource properties (museums, libraries, and places of worship); their contents; and those who operate, use, or visit them, through a comprehensive fire protection program.

The 2010 Edition adds important addition about security. The main technical changes are:

  • Expansion of the code’s goals and objectives to include ‘hazards other than fire
  • New requirement for a vulnerability assessment
  • New chapters on planning for protection, emergency operations, and security
  • A new annex describing commonly used premises protection systems and equipment

The 2010 Edition deals also with new issues as:

  • Reorganization of requirements pertaining to construction, alteration, addition, and renovation projects into one chapter
  • Addition of design and installation requirements to reduce the risk of corrosion damage in dry-pipe and preaction sprinkler systems
  • New requirements for sprinkler protection inside some exhibit cases
  • Annexes pertaining to renovation of historic structures and fire ratings of archaic materials have been deleted and are now part of NFPA 914: Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures

Measuring the Impact of Fire Extinguisher Agents on Cultural Resource Materials – Final Report (2010)

1One of the main problems posed by fire protection of cultural resources is the behavior of archaic and support materials to the effect of flames and extinguishing agents. We do not know, for example, how a watercolor painting or a fresco behave in case of fire and how water or other extinguishing agents  affect theme. Until now, there is an extremely small number  of testing and research activities carried on to improve our knowledge about this field of data. In particular, portable fire extinguishers and their associated fire extinguishing agents play an important role in reducing the impact of fire on cultural resource collections.  While conservators are well versed in the effects of moisture and water on collections, little data is available on the effects of other non-water based extinguishing agents. To fully evaluate the appropriateness of an extinguisher, its extinguishing effectiveness should be compared to the potential collateral damage to collection materials from the agent and its thermal decomposition products. Such contact with collection materials can occur by overspray during firefighting efforts or the direct spraying of collection materials in an act of vandalism.

This report, produced by the Fire Research Foundation, is downloadble from the website http://www.nfpa.org and documents Phase I of a project designed to quantify the impact of discharging portable fire extinguishing agents on cultural resource materials.

The report includes a comprehensive literature review and the development of prototype specifications and procedures to test the effects of extinguishers. In an anticipated Phase II, the test specifications would be validated and a final specification produced. The results will be used by the NFPA Technical Committee on Cultural Resources (NFPA 909 and 914) to provide users with guidance on extinguisher selection.

Cultural Heritage Fire Safety Standards – Italy

3In order to understand how cultural heritage fire safety is addressed in the world, a series of posts will describe legislations of different countries. The first post, published with the Author’s permission, is the updated version of a paper presented during the international conference  “Toward a Safer World”  – ESREL 2001. The paper illustrates the Italian rules concerning fire safety of cultural heritage: Stefano Marsella – Performance-based codes vs prescriptive rules: the case of the application to fire protection of cultural heritage in Italy.

Abstract
According to the EU Construction Product Directive, fire protection of buildings can be designed using either performance based approach (engineering methods) or prescriptive rules. In his work, the Author describes as the application to historical buildings is carried out in Italy, showing the main problems which arise with the use of prescriptive rules in a context extremely rich and complex as italian heritage and showing how, in an fire engineering approach, the special task to protect heritage and the people could be addressed.

Introduction
When engineers approach the protection of cultural heritage and, at the same time, try to safeguard human life letting people to use and enjoy buildings, the main problems they have to face in the most of historical building lie in the difficulty to meet the mandatory prescriptions. The utmost variety of architectural solution, urban situation and fire load, together with the severe needs of conservation, makes it quite difficult, if not impossible at all, to follow prescriptive rules, which will soon become not acceptable. Regarding this point, we must consider that, in Italy as well as in other countries, fire protection is carried out with a series of rules, prescriptions and standards which were been defined having as a goal new constructions and new building elements. Moreover, hygiene and occupational workplace safety rules must be enforced without any regard to the age or the historical value of the building. Another matter that has to be addressed in the upgrading of heritage to standards of safety is connected to the accessibility requirements of urban environment, matter that the ageing of population and the growing consciousness of people make a primary issue even in solving the fire evacuation problems.
In the following analysis, the Author will examine only the fire protection rules, but is intended that the problems which arise in applying fire protection rules to heritage are quite similar to the ones which accessibility and workplace hygiene and safety bring.
Looking at the problem from another point o view, it must be stressed that the authorities have to face the need to allow the public into these buildings, for political reasons, but also for the need to raise funds for their upkeep. Generally the owners, public or private, have a vested interest in preserving their property and content and should take the matter seriously enough if a definite set of rules would exist, even we must consider that exist a different challenge if the public are to be brought in. In Italy there not exists a national building regulation, neither common prescriptions for public safety, and the only prescriptions that could be used are the fire prevention standards for cinemas, theatres and dancings. So, in the case of public let in a heritage building, the primary interest in protecting people has to face the difficulty to meet a group of rules that were set specifically for buildings built to  receive a great amount  of persons.
Probably, the only reasonable approach to the problem of protecting the heritage lies in the use of a non prescriptive approach, in a framework of performance based rules which simultaneously fix the need to be satisfied with reference to accessibility, public safety and workplace safety.
In the following consideration no reference will be done to cost analysis, for the lack of data in Italy about this issue make it impossible a serious evaluation of the impact this issue on the definition of fire prevention strategies applied to cultural buildings.
1.    heritage in Italy
The problem of protecting against fire italian heritage is a main issue in the policy of safety. The worst fires occurred recently in Italy, in fact, have hit mainly important historical or cultural buildings (Teatro la Fenice – Venezia, Cappella guariniana – Sacra Sindone – Torino, Teatro Petruzzelli – Bari).
Starting from the definition of heritage, according Italian laws, may be considered historically relevant any building older than 50. In Italian heritage there are at least 95.000 monuments and churches, 30.000 historical buildings, 3.500 museums, 2.000 archeological sites and 900 theaters. In these figures we must consider that entire town centers, if not entire towns are part of the heritage, with all the risks that technological improvements bring in a so bound environment. Moreover, the most of churches and interesting buildings date back to the last ten centuries, with a great difference of construction materials, structures, content, state of conservation and use. The only amount of libraries scaffolding is several thousand km and, this statement, lets the possibility to remember that bounds don’t exist only in the works to be done inside the buildings, but also in the extinguishing substances that can be used.
2.    Italian rules on the heritage
The common challenge to the authorities, when the problem of fire protection of heritage is addressed is three‑fold:

  • to preserve the building and content from the effects of fire,
  • to protect life (includes fire-fighters) from fire.
  • to limit the impact of fire precautions on building fabric.

If it is clear that in the most of cases something needs to be done, the challenge is on what standard and by what principles should the fire precautions be based. We know that would not be appropriate to apply current standards to historic buildings.
In Italy, common buildings where people work are subject to the rules concerning their accessibility, their hygiene and health conditions and their fire protection features. With regard to such arguments, we may say that a lot of laws, regulations and codes have been enforced by Public Authorities which  concern design, construction stages and maintenance management. Moreover, if the building is considered as a part of the cultural heritage, there exist special laws which will make it extremely difficult to modify the building itself, even if in the case of works intended to preserve it. An important issue to be taken into account, is that, as a general rule, the level of safety and accessibility that laws ask must be assured in every case, so it is not possible to accept in any kind of building, say the historical or artistical heritage building, lower safety and accessibility standards.
Focusing on fire protection (which, nonetheless, is strictly bound to some accessibility prescriptions as well as to the occupational safety), in Italy there exist two prescriptive codes, which are applied in the case of historical building used as places of assembly and as archives. In both cases, emphasis has been given to the human safety, specially in order to means of egress characteristics.
May be useful to add that in Italy the specific activity of fire prevention and fire extinguishing is passed on the National Fire Department, coming from Department of Internal Affairs (Ministero dell’Interno), organised into Brigades by Province, while preservation of historic buildings (public or private owned) is bound by the Board of Architectural and Environmental Heritage (Sovrintendenza ai Beni Artistici e Ambientali).
Until now, we may say that prescriptions for fire prevention have been issued from the new building experiences having, as unique goal, people safety, but nowadays is stronger the common perception that for historic heritage the safety of inhabitants should be reconciled with the need of safeguarding historical and architectural value of buildings as well as goods contained within them.
Looking at the procedures needed to achieve the prescript level of fire safety, it must be said that a list of activities, which are subjected to periodic surveillance, is specified in a Decree of 1982. The only case where the building itself is subject to fire safety control independently from the activity held is the case of heritage buildings. Nonetheless, the control for these buildings hasn’t been in the past so strict as necessary, due to the reluctance of many Boards of Architectural and Environmental Heritage to accept the minimum required safety features and the inherent difficulty to define such features.
For any heritage building, the following obligations are established:
acquisition of preliminary approval, on behalf of the territorial qualified Provincial Fire Department Brigade, for rehabilitation works, including normative adaptation and changes in purpose of use;
acquisition of the ”fire prevention certificate” following on‑site inspection by the provincial fire Department Brigade, after the completion of the works.
In general, the aim of fire prevention rules, prescriptions and standards issued for different activities or workplaces looks at providing operators with an instrument unequivocally applicable in all cases. Designers must observe rigid bounds, which sometimes are too hard and difficult to be respected so that they are often compelled to ask for derogation through a trade off among Customer, and local Fire Department Brigade. In the case of cultural heritage has become immediately clear that it was impossible to issue fire protection standards. Too many differences and too many bounds made it impossible asking even low impact prescriptions. In order to safeguard building conservation and to assure at least safety of human life, the relevant Ministry issued two historical building oriented Decrees:

  • D.M. n. 569, issued on May 20,1992, “Regolamento concernente norme di sicurezza antincendio per gli edifici storici e artistici destinati a musei, gallerie, esposizioni e mostre” (Regulation concerning fire safety norms for historical and artistic buildings destined as museums, galleries, exposition centres, and shows)
  • D.P.R. n. 418, issued on June 30,1995, “Regolamento concernente norme di sicurezza antincendio per gli edifici di interesse storico‑artistico destinati a biblioteche ed archivi” (Regulation concerning fire safety norms for historical-artistic buildings destined as libraries and archives).

Reading such rules it becomes clear that, perhaps violating the general rule that oblige to assure the same safety level to everybody, prescriptions to protect human life are softer than in other non – historical buildings, while the building and its content aren’t perhaps so protected as necessary.
3.    the approach to fire safety in Italy
In order to take a look to the approach followed until now in fire protection in Italy, we must consider that other relevant regulations exist for specific activities, which we may find in historical buildings, that must be applied without any gap to those buildings.
As common rules to be applied actually in evaluating the fire resistance of elements, there are three different methods for determining the class of resistance: experimental methods, as specified in Ministry of the Interior circular n° 91 of 14th September 1961 (new reference: ministerial decree 16 February, 2007); simplified methods, by checking tables drafted by interpolating the data resulting from the experimental investigations in statistical series (UNI standard 9502/89, UNI standard 9503:89, UNI standard 9504/89); analytical methods, in accordance with the calculation methods indicated in the UNI standards referred to above and in the Eurocodes (1,2,3,5,6) (new reference: ministerial decree 16 February, 2007).
The experimental method asks that the duration of resistance to fire is determined on the basis of the results of a standardised fire test carried out by simulating heating with a fire chamber, applying a standardised temperature curve internationally accepted.
The brief list intends to show some of the rules that have to be compulsorily respected in planning the fire protection of  any building, explains that the framework in which a solution could eventually be found is extremely well defined, making rather difficult to individuate the different solutions that such special buildings need.
4.    the fire protection engineering approach
Fire protection engineering is addressed in the works of ISO Technical Committee 92.  Actually, the Technical Report 13387 (1999), which sets the most of the rules that have to be followed in an engineering approach to fire protection does not address the specific field of heritage, but states that, in the future, a specific branch of this discipline will study the characteristics of the analysis of fire protection in cultural and historical buildings.
In our context, where the problem is not designing brand new buildings but upgrading existing ones, the main interest of the engineering approach is bound to reach the equivalent safety level, which implies to select, alternative protective and preventive technical measures, based on the evaluation of the fire risk, in order to reach acceptable safety conditions for an activity.
Starting from this base, legislation shouldn’t indicate mandatory requirements about “what to do” but provide an information based both on the procedural and scientifically recognised methods of analysis and calculation, in order to offer alternative solutions. After a new approach has been brought in Italy with Legislative Decree n° 626/94 (now Legislative Decree n° 108/08), which incorporates the Community Directive for “improving the safety and health of workers at places of work” and with Ministry Decree dated 10.3.98, which implements it as far as concerns the risk of fire, this goal seems to be nearer, but with reference to historic or artistic value is still needed the specific knowledge that will let to enforce such approach in such a critical area.
5.    reasonable answers  to problems
When considering heritage, given that is impossible to apply prescriptive fire safety rule, performance-based approach has to be necessarily followed to solve the problem.  According to this approach, in the evaluation of the fire scenarios equal attention has to be given to life safety and heritage preservation. Moreover, the facts have demonstrated that the worst fires in historic buildings and towns have occurred in construction, renovation or restoration sites , that implies the need of a special attention to responsibilities of managers, in order to avoid unappropriate risk situations and to mantain always the level of fire safety that the risk analysis has shown as acceptable (fire drills, staff preparedness).
On the other hand, the very large number of rules that simultaneously has to be met (workplace heath and hygiene, accessibility), makes it difficult to imagine that a so wide range of prescriptions could be overtaken with a risk-assessment based process. Under this point of view, an appropriate package of precautions that meets the requirements the different regulation but which would allow performance design, is the only foreseeable solution. A check‑list, could be organised according to the following phases:

  • Identification and listing of the risks of fire in relation to the sources capable of sparking one off;
  • Forecasting of the danger of sparking off a fire in relation to the structures of the building.
  • Forecasting of the way in which the fire will develop.
  • Analysis and assessment of the means of escape.
  • Analytical valuation of the protective measures that can be adopted.
  • Definition of specifications for safety measures ‑ automatic detection systems and

extinguishing systems on the basis of the ruling regulations.
Another point that is worth to be addressed is the use of simulations. There exist a certain list of experiences and records about their use in historic buildings. For historical buildings it must be stressed that simulations are due when their outputs could be used for assessing the actual safety of the means of egress. Therefore if their capacity is very large and their accessibility is sure, of course no simulation is advisable. On the other hand, simulations can be very valuable for assessing the actual need of interventions suggested by prescriptive standards. In other words, prescriptive standards often force to perform building interventions that have a hard impact of the original structure (e.g. divisions in compartments, safety staircases, etc.). Perhaps, in some conditions not all those interventions are absolutely needed: simulations can demonstrate it. Once more, if little or no intervention is required by prescriptive standards, simulations of the smoke flow patterns are unnecessary. Finally, simulations are affordable when boundary conditions are properly set. Under this point of view. First of all, one should verify is the boundary.
Conclusions
Given that the current situation shows that prescriptive rules can’t be used in protecting heritage, in the short period efforts must be done in order to acquire more profound knowledge of fire engineering approach. After having reached an adequate sensibility to the matter (both for public control officers and fire prevention designers), fire-risk analysis will probably make possible to select accepted procedures and sets of technical features (including a small group of mandatory rules necessary to assure the minimum safety and accessibility leve) that will meet both people and heritage safety and conservation issues.
Aknowledgments
Special aknowledgements has to be done to Mr A. Dusman of the Italian National Engineers Council, who is daily involved in the improvement of the culture of italian safety engineers.

References
L.Nassi, S.Marsella – La sicurezza antincendio per i beni culturali, UTET, Torino 2008

NFPA 914 Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures – 2010 Edition

91410One of the most common difficulties fire safety professionals face in protecting historic buildings and historic sites against fire is the lack of suitable prescriptive standards.

Historic buildings hardly comply common safety rules and any specific standard for such constructions can only ask few safety features.

The only suitable way to assess safety in the most of historic buildings is using fire safety engineering methods, which pose, on  the other hand, several problems due to the lack of data about fire behavior of historic materials.

In order to help everyone who operates, uses, and visits such structures, NFPA 914: Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures (2010 edition) gives the latest requirements for fire protection and fire prevention  . Provisions of this essential document acknowledge the need to preserve the historic character of these unique occupancies while providing the necessary level of life safety and fire protection. The 2010 edition addresses fundamental arguments as:

  • security
  • prescriptive and performance-based options
  • management
  • addition, alteration and rehabilitation works, and fire precautions during construction, repair and alteration works
  • special events
  • inspection, testing and maintenance

More over the new edition address:

* Survey forms for conducting arson vulnerability assessments

* Guidance on the implementation of operational controls

* Provisions for the use of arc fault circuit interrupters (AFCIs) to protect electrical circuits

* Wildfire protection criteria

* Criteria for determining contractor qualifications

* Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for premises security systems

* Criteria for special event protection and security

* New annex containing historic building fire case studies

* New annex addressing protection of historic districts

* New annex containing security system provisions